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In this invited response to Anne Dippel’s 
chapter about the metaphors at work in the latest 
mainstream investments in artificial intelligence, 
I would ultimately like to dwell on the author’s 
statement that artificial intelligence «should be 
seen for what it truly is, a technological alien» 
(Dippel, 2019: 39). Is this an ontological and 
normative statement about what it means to be 
human? Does it mean that humans in general 
should today preserve a sense of themselves as 
prior to, and therefore rigorously distinct from, 
artificial intelligence in general? It seems to me 
that Dippel’s position is ambiguous on this point, 
and I would merely like to suggest that a non-
normative ethics of the human as always already 
technological could perform well as a critical 
supplement to Dippel’s politically important 
distinction between the embodied, biological 
processes at work in human intelligence on the 
one hand, and the disembodied masculinist 
fantasies at work in mainstream AI narratives on 
the other hand. To this end, I will first try to fairly 
reconstruct Dippel’s argument and to introduce, 
along the way, my own concern, summed up in 
the title of this commentary, with the problematic 
metaphoricity, hence artificiality, partiality and 
responsibility of any intelligent critique of artificial 
intelligence. Towards the conclusion I will bring 
into the discussion another recent publication on 
current AI stories and metaphors, namely, AI Art. 
Machine Visions and Warped Dreams by media 
theorist and artist Joanna Zylinska (2020), who has 
been working for more than a decade on a non-
humanist feminist bioethics for the age of new 
media and technoscience. 
In the first of her three commentaries, Dippel 
writes that «any comparison of human and 
artificial intelligence must be considered bizarre 
if not utterly pointless at best» (Dippel, 2019: 
35). Such an intuitive claim is made in the context 
of an autoethnographic approach that works at 
building the standpoint of a feminist mother, from 
which it becomes imperative to argue that «it is 
the politics of embodied care (Hamington 2001), 
or the politics of care in technoscience (Martin, 
Myer, Viseu 2015), that needs to be brought into a 
larger social conversation on artificial intelligence 
and its relation to what it means to be human» 
(Dippel, 2019: 35). Thus, in the end for Dippel any 
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comparison of human and artificial intelligence 
must be considered not merely bizarre or pointless, 
but in fact morally and politically dangerous because 
the oversimplified and disembodied understanding 
of intelligence in actual AI research –as computing 
power, data storage capacity, pattern recognition, 
statistical analysis and so forth– risks dismissing 
«the significance of being a responsible human 
agent altogether» (Dippel, 2019: 35). Even if one 
agrees that the meaning and significance of human 
intelligence have to do with taking responsibility, 
with taking care, one can still ask whether the 
question of framing intelligence through taking care 
and responsibility can be adequately addressed 
today within the framework of the infant and their 
mother, given this framework’s rather problematic 
history and metaphoric load. As Anne Dippel argues, 
words and metaphors have power, so one could at 
least ask how specific notions of motherhood and 
care influence perceptions of what it means to be 
human in the face of artificial intelligence and other 
technoscientific projects.
As Dippel’s sources acknowledge, from its early 
emphasis on motherhood and infant care, care 
literature has slowly but steadily developed into a 
more intersectional and geographically decentered 
set of debates that exceeds the original focus, now 
widely regarded as White and middle-class, on the 
nurturant sort of care which motherhood in general 
stands for. Care literature today addresses the many 
kinds of dirty work that, often for the lack of an 
intersectional analysis (Hankivsky, 2014), do not get 
recognition as care, however essential they might be 
for the maintenance and reproduction of human life. 
What if we asked the question of what it means to 
be human from the standpoint of such dirty work, 
that is, from the kind of infrastructural work that is 
performed by specific groups of subordinate humans, 
but also by machines and other non-human forms of 
life? Moreover, what if we asked about intelligence 
as something that perhaps cannot be reduced to 
a property of individual organisms and that might 
instead be better understood through the study of 
complex material-semiotic situations in which more-
than-human issues and power relations are at stake? 
These questions are unavoidable, it seems to me, 
in so far as they belong to the wider trajectory of 
feminist theory through which, among other things, 
care ethics has become radicalized as intersectional 
analysis of infrastructural processes and in which 
feminist epistemologies (Alcoff and Potter, 1993) have 
become radicalized through feminist science studies 
(Harding, 1991), technoscience feminism (Åsberg 
and Braidotti, 2018) and feminist posthumanities 
more generally. But they are also unavoidable in 
the context of the coronavirus pandemic, where 
differentially positioned scientists, public servants, 
healthcare workers around the world struggle and 
collaborate with numerous technologies, including 
artificial intelligence applications, to bring the viral 
other under control.
Certainly, Dippel’s subsequent commentaries on 
mainstream artificial intelligence research, which 
have an ethnographic basis and a sharp theoretical 
focus, enrich the cross-disciplinary work of feminist 
thinking with technoscience, by documenting 
empirically and clarifying the specific ways in which 
the current development of evolutionary algorithms 
attempts to symbolically resuscitate «Man of 
Reason» (Lloyd, 2002) or the abstract, disembodied, 
irresponsible subject of knowledge that feminist 
epistemologies, among other strands of feminist 
philosophy, had thoroughly demolished by the 
end of the 20th century. Demolition would appear 
to be necessary once again because, as Dippel 
notes, the feminist critique of Man, «for example 
in media studies or philosophy, i.e. disciplines, 
that reflect on the mediatedness of contemporary 
knowledge in natural sciences», continues to 
develop in segregation from mainstream science 
and technological development. Meanwhile, actual 
scientists and engineers continue to dream of the 
day when humans will «live eternally, free from 
fear and illness, as cyborgs enhanced by artificial 
intelligence» (Dippel, 2019: 37). But what is perhaps 
most incisive in Dippel’s contribution takes the form 
of a diagnosis around the current specificity of such 
a masculine dream of transcendence. Not only is 
its underlying assumption that «[h]umans are the 
standard that serves for technology as the main 
criterion in terms of intelligence» (Dippel, 2019: 38), 
but it is a rather particular vision of what humans are 
–and therefore what human intelligence amounts to 
–that serves as a standard for dreaming about and 
engaging with artificial intelligence. It is an elitist 
vision of humans as narrowly rational, calculative 
agents with no embodied moral consciousness or 
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memorably depicted, by the way, in Adam Curtis’s 
documentary The Trap (2007)1– that informs the 
neoliberal images of human triumph and success 
as well as the images of technoscientific salvation 
which only machine players, such as Deep Blue 
and AlphaGo, can apparently fulfil. Against such 
a metaphorical counterpart of actual needy and 
mortal humanity Dippel forcefully argues that «[r]
esearchers, politicians, the private sector and public 
opinion need to come to the point of communalization 
and people’s empowerment of artificial intelligence, 
which may be difficult imagine in the current political 
and economical system» (Dippel, 2019: 40). 
I am in strong agreement with Dippel’s feminist 
critique of AI metaphors of intelligence, evolution, 
and play, as I am with her broader injunction to 
democratize and communalize AI, no matter how 
improbable this currently appears to be. However, I 
would like to also offer an alternative, non-humanist, 
take on Dippel’s moral request that we see artificial 
intelligence «for what it truly is, a technological alien» 
(Dippel, 2019: 39). Having already suggested that 
we explicitly consider the well-known limitations of 
thinking human intelligence and care responsibilities 
through the gendered frameworks of human 
reproduction, I would suggest it is important to 
openly ask how the very notion of the human is time 
and again constituted through a rhetorical opposition 
between humanity (the family) and the machine (the 
alien). What gets lost, what remains unaccounted for, 
when one takes this rhetorical opposition as some 
sort of self-evident truth, for example by drawing 
on the still hegemonic equation of womanhood 
with motherhood? Besides the dirty work that some 
humans perform alongside machines for the benefit 
of normalized conceptions of the human, what gets 
lost is the kind of technical artifice, which is political 
imagination, that might make possible more critical 
and creative paths for becoming with Artificial 
Intelligence. In short, what gets lost is the who, the 
how, and the what for of «communalization and 
people’s empowerment» (Dippel, 2019: 40).
At some point in her chapter, Anne Dippel seems 
to gloss over the long-term contributions of Donna 
Haraway’s cyborg feminism by associating the cyborg 
image in general with an inclusive version of artificial 
intelligence that ignores the political sphere and the 
1  The Trap: What Happened to Our Dream of Freedom is a BBC television documentary series which explores the modern concept and 
definition of freedom. It consists of three 60-minute programmes: chapter 1 Fuck you, buddy; chapter 2 The Lonely Robot; and chapter 3 
We will force you to be free.
social consequences of AI. This is unfortunate given 
Haraway’s rich, complex and multi-faceted critique 
of scientific metaphors, as well as her enduring 
commitment to situated, embodied, oppositional 
storytelling in the service of a radical democratization 
of technoscience, and more recently in the service of 
a non-reproductive, multi-species reimagination of 
care and modest survival through critical, that is, non-
innocent, technoscientific collaborations (Haraway, 
2016). Partly in acknowledgment of Haraway’s work, 
which belongs to the living legacy of technoscience 
feminism more generally, Joanna Zylinska’s recent 
book on AI Art (2020) invites us –cultural critics of 
science and technology– to consider the specific 
role of artistic and literary approaches in facing up 
ethically and politically to the latest techno-hype. 
Zylinska shares Dippel’s diagnosis that «capital-
fuelled human thinking on AI itself manifests a 
rather narrow set of intelligence markers, which are 
premised on a truncated, disembodied and yet so-
very-gendered model of human subjectivity». AI, she 
goes on, is indeed premised on «hydrophobia, i.e. 
wariness of the material or, better, elemental side of 
media technology» (Zylinska, 2020: 41). Yet instead 
of pitching the human (mother or child) against the 
machine, Zylinska proposes «to see different forms of 
human activity, including art, as having always been 
technical, and thus also, to some extent, artificially 
intelligent» (Zylinska, 2020: 13).
From the standpoint of a feminist practitioner of 
the posthumanities, I would argue that bringing the 
politics of care in technoscience to the larger social 
conversation requires a non-rationalist approach 
to politics as well as a non-normative ethics of the 
human as always already artificially intelligent. As 
Zylinska points out, «the very concept of artificial 
intelligence is premised on artifice, which in its Latin 
etymology (artificium) goes beyond the current 
meaning of deception and trickery to signal art, craft, 
and skill» (Zylinska, 2020: 32). To understand the 
human condition in this way is not to feed dreams of 
cyborg transcendence as long as art, craft, and skill are 
regarded as material, precarious, and power-ridden. 
If, in this sense, humans are indeed «quintessentially 
technical beings» (Zylinska, 2020: 27), how does 
such a perspective call for better stories and better 
questions in the face of the current AI techno-hype? 
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Throughout her book Zylinska examines AI art’s 
potential, as well as its limitations and its ideological 
pitfalls, in the task of demystifying technoscientific 
narratives by highlighting social and political issues 
around «creativity, intelligence, perception and 
the role and position of the human in the world –
including questions of labour, robotisation and the 
long-term survival of the human species» (Zylinska, 
2020: 17). While this is not the place for an extended 
review of Zylinska’s book, I merely want to offer it 
here as a critical supplement to Dippel’s notion of 
artificial intelligence as a technological alien. Once 
we acknowledge that the alien is within, that it is 
already in a broader social conversation that takes 
the form of «a confluence of technical and cultural 
changes, industry claims, popular anxieties, moral 
panics and creative interventions across different 
media and platforms» (Zylinska, 2020: 35), an 
non-determined we is able to emerge through 
each instance of questioning, through multiple 
material-semiotic registers: «Whose brainchild (and 
bodychild) is the AI of today? Who and what does 
AI make life better for? Who and what can’t it see?» 
(Zylinska, 2020: 29).
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